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Rescuing the Balance?
An Assessment of Canada’s Proposal to Limit
ISP Liability for Online Copyright Infringement
Scott Nesbitt †

Introduction

suggests that the underlying rationale and potential
impact of Canada’s proposed reforms in this area warrant careful assessment. The issue of ISP liability raises
important questions regarding not only the ability of
copyright law to sensibly adapt to new technologies, but
also more introspective questions about the fundamental
purpose of intellectual property regimes generally. Examination of the legal issues raised by the realities of digitization suggests that, at least from the perspective of
copyright owners and ISPs, the proposed amendments to
limit the liability of ISPs are both a necessary and appropriate response to the technical exigencies of enforcing
copyright on the Internet. In this respect, proposed limitations on ISP liability clarify legal uncertainty concerning liability for online copyright infringement. In
displaying this sensitivity to technology, the government
might be commended for bringing the Copyright Act up
to digital speed. However, closer examination of the proposals and consideration of their possible consequences
suggests that support for these reforms must be tempered. Although the contemplated ISP liability regime
may help the Copyright Act balance the interests of ISPs
and content providers, it nonetheless risks extending
excessive enforcement powers to rights holders. Ironically, in an atmosphere where many presume that the
challenge which new technologies present to copyright
is how to ensure sufficient rights protection for owners,
the proposed reforms may go too far in shifting the
balance in favour of protecting rights holders and away
from promoting the public interest.
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n June 22, 2001, the Government of Canada issued
its Framework for Copyright Reform 1 and signalled that Phase III of its amendments to the Copyright
Act 2 would attempt to modernize the legislative scheme
to meet the complexities of the digital age. As then Minister of Industry Brian Tobin indicated, the impulse for
reform stems not only from the desire to adequately
protect the creative works of artists, but also from the
recognition that an effective copyright regime promises
broader social and economic benefits:
Canada needs a copyright framework that continuously
adapts to a fast-changing digital environment. The Copyright Act is an important lever to promote innovation, entrepreneurship and success in the new economy . . . . A worldclass copyright regime can help us grow the Internet, electronic commerce and e-learning in Canada. 3

Although the federal government suggests that there
is a ‘‘renewed sense of urgency regarding reform of the
Copyright Act ’’ 4 and such legislation has already been
passed in other jurisdictions — most notably the United
States 5 and the European Union 6 — Canada is taking a
relatively slow and cautious approach to reform. 7
Released together with the Framework for Copyright
Reform, the government’s Consultation Paper on Digital
Copyright Issues 8 outlines proposed changes to the
statute and solicits feedback from interested stakeholders. 9 This document proposes four major amendments. The first of these would introduce a ‘‘making
available’’ right to confirm that copyright holders do in
fact have an exclusive right to post material on the
Internet. 10 The remaining three proposals deal with how
copyright will be enforced and infringement discouraged in the digital environment. These include provisions that would protect rights management information
embedded in digital works, 11 restrict circumvention of
technological measures designed to safeguard copyright
material, 12 and, perhaps most importantly, limit the liability of Internet service providers (ISPs). 13
The controversy that has engulfed legislative
amendments to limit ISP liability in other jurisdictions

This paper attempts both to explain the technological and legal imperatives pressing Canada to address the
issue of ISP liability in reforms to the Copyright Act and
to raise some concerns about the impact of the government’s proposed amendments in this area. The basic
elements of copyright law, the impact of digital technology on copyright and the policy arguments surrounding ISP liability are briefly discussed to set the
context for judicial treatment of and legislative action on
this issue. Next, the paper focuses on the development of
American jurisprudence with respect to limitation of ISP
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liability for third party copyright infringement, 14
including examination of the pre-existing legal uncertainty in this area as well as the clarification offered in
the DMCA. The position in Canadian law is then
assessed, highlighting in particular how proposed
amendments to the Copyright Act help resolve the legal
questions surrounding ISP liability that remain unanswered after the Copyright Board’s Tariff 22 decision
and its subsequent judicial review by the Federal Court
of Appeal. 15 Theoretical justifications of copyright law
are considered as a measure against which to assess
whether the effects of the proposed new enforcement
regime accord with the fundamental purposes of copyright law. The paper concludes that, although the proposed amendments limiting ISP liability are an adequate
first step in helping copyright confront new technologies,
they must be fine-tuned in order to better protect the
public interest before any legislation is passed.

Background to Reform
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efore launching into an analysis of the intricacies of
the legal rationale for copyright reform, it is appropriate to first briefly outline the basic nature of copyright
law, the challenges digital technology presents, and the
reasons why ISPs have become the focus of many
debates about how to police online copyright infringement.

The Statutory Creature that is Copyright
Copyright law is a creature of statute; the only rights
available to copyright holders are those outlined in the
legislation. 16 First passed in Canada in 1924, the Copyright Act grants specified protections to the creators of
original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. 17 In
most circumstances, the term of the copyright extends
for the life of the creator plus fifty years. 18 Although the
author or creator is the first owner of the copyright in a
work, 19 he or she can license or assign the rights available
under the Act either in whole or in part. 20 The Act
provides copyright holders with an exclusive ‘‘bundle of
rights’’ that are cumulative and distinct from any tangible right in the material work itself. 21 These are listed
in section 3(1) and include the sole right to: produce or
reproduce a work or any substantial part thereof; perform the work in public; translate a work; convert a
work from one medium to another; and communicate
the work to the public by telecommunication. The rights
holder also has the right to authorize anyone else to do
any of the activities protected under the other enumerated rights. In addition, the original author retains the
moral rights in a work for the duration of the term of
protection. 22
Direct copyright infringement occurs whenever a
person, without the consent of the copyright holder,
does anything that the owner has the exclusive right to
do under section 3(1). 23 It is also an ‘‘indirect’’ infringe-
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ment to knowingly distribute an infringing work for the
purposes of trade or to such an extent that it prejudicially affects the owner of the copyright, to sell or rent an
infringing work, or to import an infringing work into
Canada for sale or hire. 24 The Act provides several ‘‘fair
dealing’’ exemptions to liability for infringement,
including the reproduction of works for private study or
research, criticism, review and newspaper summary. 25
Where an alleged infringer fails to bring its activities
within one of these exemptions, rights holders can apply
for damages, injunctions, accounting of profits and
delivery of infringing works. 26 Criminal sanctions may
also be imposed against those who knowingly distribute,
import or trade in infringing works. 27

Digital Challenges
As the rights of owners are fixed by statute, new
technological developments inevitably challenge preexisting legal concepts of copyright and the traditional
mechanisms used to enforce it. As Professor Ginsburg
explains, ‘‘The setting of the copyright balance is not
immutable; rather, each significant technological progress may alter the balance of control between authors
and users, in turn eventually prompting a new legal calibration’’. 28 Indeed, the history of copyright law reflects
an almost continuous trend of reaction to technology
and recalibration of the law. The advent of the player
piano, camera, radio, television, photocopier, audio tape
recorder and video cassette recorder have all presented
new challenges to copyright and provoked a rethinking
of the law. 29
Despite this history of adaptation, there is nonetheless a sense that the combined force of digital technology
and the Internet present a previously unparalleled threat
to the continued vitality of copyright law. The ability to
convert works based in text, images, video and sound to
digital format has dramatically increased the ability to
store, manipulate and distribute such material. 30 In addition, copying becomes infinitely easier — with the further advantage that the quality of each digital reproduction is virtually indistinguishable from the original. And,
of course, the growth of the Internet has only accentuated the ease and speed with which such works can be
located, accessed and shared around the globe. 31 As
numerous commentators have noted, these technological developments render copyright works extremely vulnerable to piracy and unauthorized reproduction; no
longer do such infringements depend upon the possession of a tangible product or rely on more easily supervised physical modes of distribution. 32 Perhaps even
more alarmingly, the nature of copyright infringement is
shifting from commercial piracy operations to pervasive
individual copying for private purposes. 33 Not only does
this disperse the locus of control through which an
owner might protect a work, but it also risks sanctioning
a social attitude that ‘‘increasingly looks upon the imme-
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diate copying and sharing of information for non-commercial purposes as a fundamental right’’. 34
Creators and copyright industries are understandably concerned about the scale of infringement that digital technology and the Internet make possible. One
observer suggests that copying of protected works on the
Internet has reached ‘‘epidemic proportions’’ and estimates worldwide annual losses to the software industry
alone at $13 billion. 35 Here in Canada, the Canadian
Recording Industry Association (CRIA) attributes a 10%
drop in sales of recorded works between 2000 and 2001
to the proliferation of Internet piracy. 36 However, in
addition to this economic self-interest, there is a broader
public concern that without adequate copyright protection, creators will simply refuse to make their works
available in the digital environment. 37 Any such disincentive threatens to empty the Internet of its substantive
content and thus to diminish its technological promise
of increased global access to a wider diversity of information:
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Unless they can become author-friendly, digital media may
remain just that: media, without content . . . . If all kinds of
works of authorship, particularly those of intense creativity
and imagination are to embark willingly on the cyber-road,
then authors require some assurance that the journey will
not turn into a hijacking. 38

The result of inadequate copyright protection then,
is not only a diminution of creative content on the
Internet, but also a lack of investment in technology that
may ultimately hurt society as a whole. 39
Of course, the very same facets of digital technology
and the Internet that spark so much trepidation among
copyright holders — particularly the speed and ease of
distributing works — also promise great benefits if the
copyright regime can be effectively extended to this new
environment. As a result, several alternatives have been
forwarded to enhance the ability of copyright owners to
enforce their rights. One of the most commonly posited
options is to impose some form of liability on ISPs for
the online infringement of their subscribers.

ISPs: An Appropriate Target for Liability?
Faced with the prospect of potentially massive copyright infringement in the online environment, copyright
owners and government regulators have turned to ISPs
as potential targets for liability. 40 No doubt this is in part
because it is so difficult for copyright owners to track
diffuse and anonymous individual private infringers;
and, no doubt that this is also in part because such
individuals are frequently impecunious and therefore
not worth prosecuting. These constraints, contrasted
with the relative ease with which ISPs can be identified
and their comparably ‘‘deep-pockets’’, clearly make ISPs a
preferred defendant for copyright infringement actions. 41
Having thus found a more rewarding avenue of enforcement, copyright owners often assume that ISPs have the
right and ability to control or supervise the actions of
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their subscribers and therefore argue that ISPs are best
situated to prevent or pay for infringement. 42 Alternatively, theories of loss-spreading are invoked to justify ISP
liability because, even if they do not have direct control
over or derive direct financial benefit from subscribers’
infringements, ISPs nonetheless provide the means for
and reap profits from the consumer appeal of such activities. 43 Frequently, these arguments mesh together, as is
evident in SOCAN’s reply to the Consultation Paper :
ISPs are the one place that is currently regulated by Canadian law, have a large capital investment and have a physical
connection to everyone of their customers. No payment, no
access to the Internet for an individual user. . . . ISP’s subscriber base is driven by the free content that is available on
the Internet. The ISPs have been the general beneficiary of
the current situation which is very unfair to rights holders.
Rights holders are not getting paid, ISPs are. This needs to
be addressed. 44

From a somewhat less adversarial perspective, commentators also suggest that imposing liability on ISPs not
only will help to compensate rights holders and spread
the costs of infringement, but also engage ISPs in the task
of deterring subscriber infringement. 45
In response to these arguments for liability, ISPs and
others assert that the technical reality of Internet transmissions makes any attempt to impose liability for copyright infringement upon ISPs unfair and unreasonable.
Admittedly, ISPs are usually commercial operations that
supply and operate the equipment and software required
to provide a subscriber with Internet access. They also
make arrangements with other ISPs to facilitate access to
the ‘‘network of networks’’ that is the Internet and
operate routers and other equipment to forward information to designated addresses. 46 In these transmission
and networking tasks, ISPs inevitably make temporary
digital copies of all material that passes through their
systems. But, as the Canadian Association of Internet
Providers points out, ‘‘ISPs do not select the content that
is transmitted over their facilities; rather, they merely
transmit the content that has been selected by others’’. 47
And, such arguments continue, neither the equipment
nor the connections ISPs supply enable them to effectively monitor the endless stream of packeted information that flows through their facilities. It is simply technologically infeasible for ISPs to screen out the infringing
transmissions of subscribers: ‘‘Given the volumes of
information, reviewing the content of the billions of trillions of bits of information that are transmitted over
systems of information providers, it is operationally
impossible for such persons to review and monitor the
information not originated by them’’. 48 If this is true of
transmissions that pass through their systems, Skelton
convincingly argues that it is equally as technically and
economically unrealistic to expect ISPs to supervise the
extensive and ever-changing content they may host for
subscribers in the form of Web pages or temporarily
cached sites. 49
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These competing policy arguments, coupled with
the technical complexity and variability of the relationships between ISPs and their subscribers, have caused
significant legal difficulty in resolving the issue of ISP
liability for online copyright infringement. This is true of
attempts to determine whether ISPs can be held liable
because of either their own direct actions or those of
their subscribers. As the analysis of the American and
Canadian caselaw below suggests, the difficulty the
courts have encountered in resolving this area of the law
justifies and warrants the proposed amendments to the
Copyright Act.

The American Position: From
Judicial Uncertainty to the DMCA
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lthough there are important distinctions between
American and Canadian copyright law, reviewing
how the legal approach to ISP liability developed in
American jurisprudence nonetheless serves as a useful
starting point for understanding how these issues might
be settled in Canada. 50 Brief examination of the relevant
cases indicates that, although initial judicial treatment of
the subject applied copyright law in a rigid manner
largely insensitive to the realities of new technologies,
American courts eventually adopted a more flexible
approach to copyright infringement that substantially
limited the liability of ISPs. Nonetheless, lingering uncertainty as to the state of the law and resulting fear that this
would inhibit ISP investment in network technology
eventually compelled legislative reform. 51 The DMCA
now offers a comprehensive codification of the rules
governing ISP liability.

Frena: Root of ISP concern
The first U.S. case involving a service intermediary
in a claim for online copyright infringement adopted a
strict approach to liability that could have had troubling
results for all ISPs. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 52
the defendant operated a BBS that stored unauthorized
copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted pictures and made
these available to customers who accessed the BBS via
telephone modem. Schlesinger D.J. held that Frena
infringed the plaintiff’s exclusive right of public distribution because he operated a product that contained unauthorized copies of the works and allowed them to be
transmitted from one place to another. 53 In addition,
Frena infringed Playboy’s right to public display, as
merely storing pictures that were accessible to paying
customers constituted a ‘‘display in public’’. 54 Such findings caused some alarm for ISPs given that the Court
accepted that Frena himself did not post any of the
infringing photographs and that any copies on the BBS
were made automatically and without Frena’s knowledge:
There is irrefutable evidence of direct copyright infringement in this case. It does not matter that defendant Frena
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may have been unaware of the copyright infringement.
Intent to infringe is not needed to find copyright infringement. Intent or knowledge is not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable for
infringement. 55

Indeed, the finding of liability for the BBS operator
was even more disconcerting from the perspective of
ISPs given that as soon as Frena became aware of the
infringing material he removed it and monitored future
subscriber uploads to prevent Playboy’s pictures from
being posted.
The finding that passive copying on a BBS made the
operator liable for direct infringement was clearly problematic in that it failed to recognize that all such
intermediaries must make a temporary copy of a file
before any transmission. Such an approach to liability
necessarily leads to almost unlimited ISP liability for the
transmissions and postings of not only its own subscribers, but also those of any third party message or
posting transmitted through its system. As Yen notes, the
Court’s failure to apply a knowledge requirement for
direct infringement within the digital environment
results in ‘‘tortured reasoning’’ that ignores technical realities. 56 This critique notwithstanding, the Northern District Court of California followed the Frena decision one
year later. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA 57 the
plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction on the
grounds that the defendant’s mere creation and operation of a BBS was sufficient to establish direct liability for
infringement where copyrighted material appeared on
its system. The Clinton administration’s Information
Infrastructure Task Force’s recommendation that service
providers should be found liable for copyright infringement only exacerbated the concern of ISPs. 58 The Task
Force largely accepted the loss-spreading arguments for
such an approach, indicating that since ISPs are for-profit
businesses, finding liability to some extent was reasonable and would help compensate rights owners for
online infringement. Confronted with these judicial
decisions and policy directions, there appeared to be a
high risk that ISPs would be liable for infringing activities beyond their technical means of control.

Netcom and after: Soothing ISP fears?
In the Netcom 59 decision, the Court devoted significantly more attention to the technological issues underlying the question of ISP liability for online copyright
infringement. Consequently, it reached a result that
helped to alleviate, at least in part, the concerns that grew
out of Frena. In this case, the plaintiff RTC held the
copyright in certain published and unpublished works of
L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of
Scientology. RTC claimed that the defendant Erlich, a
former member of the Church, posted works to a
newsgroup critical of the Church and thereby infringed
its rights. Erlich posted the material through a BBS operated by the defendant Klemesrud, who in turn made the
newsgroup material available over the Internet through a
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connection with Netcom, one of the largest American
ISPs at the time. Erlich would post material to the
newsgroup and transmit it to the BBS by dialling directly
into Klemesrud’s computer. From here, the files would
then be automatically copied from Klemesrud’s computer onto the Netcom server where they could then be
accessed over the Internet. So, Netcom was only actually
tangentially related to Erlich; Klemesrud was actually the
Netcom subscriber. The Court considered three arguments with respect to Netcom’s infringement: first, that
it was directly liable because it owned equipment that
made, stored, and transmitted copies of copyrighted
material (as did the BBS operator in Frena); second, that
Netcom’s relationship with Erlich was sufficiently close
to result in vicarious infringement; and third, that
Netcom knowingly provided service to an infringing
subscriber (Klemesrud) and was therefore liable for contributory infringement. 60
On the first issue of direct liability, Whyte D.J.
emphatically rejected the strict liability approach to
infringement that the Court adopted in Frena. Even
though infringement of the right to reproduce the work
is usually treated as a strict liability offence, the Court
held that ‘‘there should still be some element of volition
or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system
is merely used to create a copy by a third party’’. 61 Exhibiting a greater understanding of the technology of the
Internet and the function of ISPs, Whyte D.J. noted that
the argument for finding direct infringement by Netcom
would, carried to its natural extreme, result in unreasonable liability for ISPs for all Internet transmissions. This
would be inconsistent with the technical feasibility of
screening out infringing bits of data that might be transmitted through an ISP’s system. 62 In addition to dismissing the claim for direct infringement of the reproduction right, the Court also dismissed claims against
Netcom for infringement of the rights to distribute and
display the works to the public that were successful in
Frena. An ISP that merely stores and passes along
messages — acting as a ‘‘passive conduit’’ — could not be
considered to have caused the works to be publicly distributed or displayed. 63
Under American copyright law, a party can be held
vicariously liable for the actions of a primary infringer if
it has both a right and ability to control the infringer’s
acts and a direct financial interest in the exploitation of
the copyrighted materials. 64 As Netcom reserved the
right to disable subscriber access as part of its terms and
conditions and evidence showed that it had done so in
the past, the Court found that the first control element
for vicarious infringement was satisfied. 65 However, RTC
failed to prove that Erlich’s infringements enhanced the
value of Netcom’s services or attracted it new subscribers. Despite the fact that Netcom advertised itself as
providing easy, regulation-free Internet access, the Court
was not prepared to presume that it had a direct financial interest in the infringing activities of its subscribers.
The Court reasoned by analogy from a series of landlord
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and tenant cases: while a landlord who increases a
tenant’s rent in proportion to the tenant’s infringing sales
might be vicariously liable, a landlord who simply
charges a regular monthly rent without regard to the
tenant’s activities is not. Netcom, the Court held, in
charging a flat monthly access fee, resembles the latter
and could not be said to have a direct financial interest
in the infringement. 66 However, despite this discussion,
the judge did not entirely foreclose the possibility that in
some circumstances an ISP could be liable for vicarious
infringement. 67 Ultimately, the plaintiffs in this case
failed to establish direct financial benefit as a fact, thus
leaving this issue open for future debate, especially given
that the relationship between Erlich and Netcom was in
this case an indirect one.
Third and finally, the Court considered whether
Netcom, even if not directly or vicariously liable for
infringement, might have committed contributory
infringement. This is a judicially developed doctrine in
U.S. copyright law that applies where a defendant ‘‘with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another’’. 68 Here, the Court refused to grant Netcom’s
claim for summary judgment on the contributory
infringement issue because it was factually unclear
whether Netcom knew or should reasonably have
known that Erlich had infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. 69 Evidence suggested that RTC forwarded a notice
to Netcom requesting it to block access to Erlich’s material but the notice itself was not presented to the Court.
Whyte D.J. was prepared to accept that if the contents of
the notice were sufficient to satisfy the ‘‘knowledge’’
requirement, Netcom’s failure to block Erlich’s messages
from reaching the Internet would amount to ‘‘substantive participation’’ in infringement of the plaintiff’s distribution right and justify a finding of contributory
infringement. 70 In considering the form of notice that an
owner would have to send to bring subscriber information within the ISP’s ‘‘knowledge’’, the court suggested
that it must contain more than ‘‘a mere unsupported
allegation’’ but need not be ‘‘unequivocal proof’’ of
infringement. An ISP could, however, claim lack of reasonable knowledge if its subscriber could show that
there was ‘‘at least a colourable claim of fair use’’. 71
In limiting the liability of ISPs acting as ‘‘mere conduits’’ for both direct and vicarious infringement, the
Netcom decision presented a more technologically
sound approach that suggested copyright should not be
inflexibly applied to the Internet. However, the lack of
evidence before the Court on contributory infringement
left open major questions about the liability and obligations of ISPs once notified or aware of a subscriber’s
infringing activity. And while subsequent cases did not
upset the Netcom position on direct and vicarious
infringement of ISPs, they did little to clarify the issue of
contributory infringement. For example, in a summary
judgment application, the Northern District Court of
Illinois applied Netcom to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims

120
for direct and vicarious liability against an ISP that
hosted a subscriber’s Web site containing infringing
material, but allowed the contributory infringement
issue to proceed because of a lack of evidence regarding
the notice and knowledge requirements. 72 And, although
at the trial of the above-mentioned MAPHIA case the
Court rejected the preliminary finding that the defendant directly infringed merely by operating a BBS system
that contained infringing material, it nonetheless found
that a BBS operator that expressly encouraged subscribers to upload infringing copies of video games was a
contributory infringer. 73 Similarly, BBS operators that
actually posted infringing material themselves and provided incentives for subscribers to do likewise would be
liable for both direct and contributory infringement. 74
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Legislative Reform & Increased Certainty:
The DMCA
Despite the more reasonable approach to ISP liability outlined in Netcom and subsequent cases, commentators nonetheless remained concerned about the
status of this issue in American law. The Netcom
approach of limiting liability for direct and vicarious
infringement while leaving open the possibility of contributory infringement seemed to accord with the
inability of ISPs to monitor all content but potential
ability to control specified access. However, none of
these District Court decisions was subjected to appellate
review and Frena technically remained good law. 75 In
addition to the possibility that Netcom could be overruled, the notice requirements and ISP obligations under
the contributory infringement issue remained vague. As
Professor Yen remarked: ‘‘Initial jousting over ISP liability has proven inconclusive. Although courts show an
understandable reluctance to hold ISPs liable for the
deliberate behaviour of others, the few judicial decisions
that exist are by no means conclusive’’. 76 These uncertainties, coupled with a belief that Congress was better
situated to deal with the complex technological issues
and broad policy implications tied to this area of copyright law, led many to conclude that legislation on the
issue of ISP liability for online infringement was necessary. 77
Congress responded to these pressures in 1998
when it passed the DMCA. Title II of the Act includes
detailed provisions regarding ISP liability. Although
heavily criticized for its ‘‘cumbersome and disorganized
structure’’, 78 the DMCA basically provides a statutory
limitation of liability for ISPs with respect to both their
own activities and those of their subscribers. To be eligible for the limitations, an ISP first must adopt and
inform its subscribers of a policy to terminate accounts
of repeat copyright infringers. 79 If this pre-condition is
met, the Act’s four ‘‘safe harbours’’ exempt an ISP from
liability for any infringement where it: (1) acts only as a
mere conduit for transmissions; 80 (2) performs system
caching functions; 81 (3) stores infringing material on its
systems or networks at the direction of users (i.e., pro-
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vides Web page hosting for subscribers); 82 or, (4) supplies
information location tools (i.e., links or directories) that
might infringe. 83 ISPs can only benefit from the second
and third exemptions if it: does not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing activities; does not
receive a direct financial benefit from the infringing
activity; and, upon obtaining knowledge or notice which
makes infringing activities apparent, ‘‘responds expeditiously’’ to remove or disable access to the infringing
material. 84
While these provisions essentially codify the
Netcom approach to ISP liability, the DMCA clarifies the
uncertainties regarding notice provisions and ISP obligations upon being made aware of an alleged infringement. An elaborate notice and take-down regime is set
out in the Act, including details regarding the content of
a notice. 85 There is also a further limitation of liability
from any claims brought by subscribers for wrongful
termination of service against ISPs that remove or disable
access to infringing material in response to a notice of
infringement. 86 So, unlike Netcom, which suggested that
a ‘‘colourable claim of fair use’’ might negate the ISP’s
‘‘knowledge’’ of infringement obligations, the DMCA
obviates the need for the ISP to assess the merits of an
alleged infringement. The Act simply errs in favour of
having ISPs remove allegedly infringing material. 87 A
copyright owner can also obtain a subpoena to compel
an ISP to release the identity and location of an alleged
infringer. 88 Overall, the DMCA’s limitation of liability
scheme encourages ISPs to be ‘‘good citizens’’ and help
copyright owners stop infringement once it is brought to
their attention. 89 Although copyright owners cannot
recover directly from ISPs, there is considerable incentive
for ISPs to block access to allegedly infringing material
and to assist owners in finding primary infringers. In this
way, the DMCA enhances the enforceability of copyright
online without placing an undue burden on ISPs.

The Canadian Position: Tariff 22
and Lingering Questions

U

nlike the American experience, Canadian courts
have yet to directly confront the issue of ISP liability for copyright infringement in relation to either its
own activities or those of its subscribers. 90 Indeed, the
only judicial consideration of the topic arose somewhat
circuitously through the Copyright Board’s decision with
respect to SOCAN’s proposed Tariff 22 and the Federal
Court of Appeal’s subsequent judicial review of the
Board’s decision. 91 Filed pursuant to s. 67.1 of the Copyright Act, the proposed tariffs would have required ISPs
to pay royalties for the communication of musical works
owned by SOCAN over digital networks such as the
Internet. In the course of its Phase I discussion of the
legal elements of the tariff proposal, the Copyright Board
addressed several issues relating to Internet communications and the liability of ISPs. However, as the discussion
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below suggests, even with the Federal Court of Appeal’s
review of the Board’s decision and the recent granting of
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the fact
that ISP liability was only indirectly before the Board
leaves substantial gaps in any assessment as to how Canadian courts might approach ISP copyright liability. Ultimately, given these uncertainties, the proposed amendments to the Copyright Act remain necessary.

Direct Infringement
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Although Internet transmissions and the activities of
ISPs might implicate several direct rights of copyright
owners, Tariff 22 holds that, at a minimum, Internet
transmissions constitute communications to the public
by telecommunications and therefore potentially
infringe s. 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act. 92 More significantly for ISPs however, the Board found that the person
who communicates a work by telecommunication is
generally not the ISP but rather the individual who initially posts the work:
The person who posts a work (usually the content provider)
does so for the sole purpose that it be accessed by others.
Since Internet transmissions are communications, one
should look at the source of the transmission to find out
who is responsible for it. Any communication of a work
occurs because a person has taken all of the required steps to
make the work available for communication. The fact that
this is achieved at the request of the recipient or through an
agent neither adds to, nor detracts from the fact that the
content provider effects the communication. 93

The Board went even further to suggest that the
person who initially posts the work to the Internet
remains liable for the communication to the public by
telecommunication infringement, even if the transmission of the work originates from a cache or mirror server
where the ISP may have stored a temporary copy of the
work. 94 According to the Board, because an ISP neither
initiates nor receives the transmission of information
along its system, an ISP cannot itself be said to be communicating to the public.
While the focus on the person who initially posts
material as the communicator seems sufficient to
exclude ISPs from liability for infringing the s. 3(1)(f)
right of copyright owners, the Board also held that the
s. 2.4(1)(b) ‘‘common carrier’’ exemption applied to ISPs.
This section provides that ‘‘a person whose only act in
respect of the communication of a work . . . to the public
consists of providing the means of telecommunication
necessary for another person to so communicate the
work . . . does not communicate the work . . . to the
public’’. 95 The section has historically applied to exempt
from liability those service providers that function as a
‘‘mere conduit’’ for the communications of infringing
materials by a primary infringer and exists to encourage
wide dissemination of works to the public. 96 However,
there was considerable uncertainty about whether the
exemption would be extended to cover ISPs in
Canada. 97 The Board clearly stated that an ISP that
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restricts its activities to that of an intermediary transmitter would receive the benefit of the exemption:
As long as its role in respect of any given transmission is
limited to providing the means necessary to allow data initiated by other persons to be transmitted over the Internet,
and as long as the ancillary services it provides fall short of
involving the act of communicating the work or authorizing
the communication, it should be allowed to claim the
exemption. 98

The Board suggested that to determine whether an
ISP acts merely as a passive conduit or something more
requires examination of the function of the ISP in each
transaction. Where, for example, an ISP itself posts content, creates embedded links, or moderates newsgroups,
it can no longer claim the exemption. 99 However, the
Board indicated that an ISP would not be precluded
from relying on the s. 2.4(1)(b) exemption simply
because it provides caching services because a cache ‘‘is
but an intrinsic element of the telecommunications
system that is the Internet’’. 100 The Board considered
such procedures ‘‘ancillary to providing the means of
telecommunication’’ and therefore still within the
exemption from liability under s. 2.4(1)(b). 101
While the Federal Court of Appeal did not take
issue with the Board’s holdings that the person who
posts material communicates it to the public and that
ISPs generally meet the criteria of s. 2.4(1)(b), 102 the
majority found that the Board erred in deciding that ISPs
continued to benefit from the common carrier exemption even if they performed caching activities. Evans J.A.,
with Linden J.A. concurring, adopted a strict definition
of the term ‘‘necessary’’ in s. 2.4(1)(b) and concluded that
an ISP provides the means of telecommunication necessary for another person to communicate only so far as
without the ISP’s activities the Internet would not in all
probability have been used as the medium of telecommunication. 103 Accordingly, while storing infringing
material as a host server is necessary, caching is not. 104
Evans J.A rejected the Board’s characterization of caching
as an intrinsic element of providing the means of telecommunication:
In my opinion . . . the fact that the cache enhances the speed
of transmission and reduces the cost to the Internet access
provider does not render the cache a practical necessity for
communication. Desirable as these features may be, they do
not justify giving the word ‘‘necessary’’ a broader meaning
than it normally bears, especially if this would further erode
copyright holders’ right to be compensated for the use of
their works by others. 105

Without evidence that Internet transmission is
made either so slow or expensive without ISP caching
that it would become economically or practically unfeasible, the Court refused to accept that caching activities
are ‘‘necessary’’. Furthermore, the Court held that in
selecting which material to cache and programming a
server to transmit from a cache when that material is
requested, an ISP ceased to be ‘‘only’’ a passive transmitter of data. 106 Therefore, in transmitting material
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from a cache, an ISP itself infringes the owner’s right to
communicate to the public by telecommunication.
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The majority’s approach to caching is an overly rigid
interpretation of the wording of the s. 2.4(1)(b) exemption that contradicts Evans J.A.’s own suggestion that
‘‘where its language and underlying rationale permit, legislation should be interpreted in a way that takes
account of technological developments’’. 107 Dissenting
only on this single point, Sharlow J.A. preferred to define
‘‘necessary’’ in a way that would give the common carrier
exemption ‘‘enough flexibility to recognize incremental
technological improvements’’. 108 Even if it is not strictly
necessary to enable Internet communications, caching
enhances the speed and efficiency of transmissions and is
appropriately characterized as ancillary to Internet communications and within the protective scope of the
s. 2.4(1) exemption. 109 Pre-Tariff 22 commentatory supported this broader approach of ‘‘necessary’’ and continued shelter of the s. 2.4(1) exemption despite an ISP’s
caching activities. 110 As Sharlow J.A. suggests, to adopt the
more narrow definition ‘‘sets the bar too high’’ and erects
an impractical barrier preventing both ISPs and their
subscribers from benefiting from the increased efficiencies available in what is essentially the automated process
of caching.

Tariff 22’s lengthy discussion of ISP liability in relation to the right to communicate to the public by telecommunication is significant both for the potential
direct infringements of ISPs that it forecloses and those
which it leaves open. On the one hand, the Board’s
categorization of Internet transmissions as a communication to the public by telecommunication excludes the
possibility that in transmitting subscriber information
ISPs might infringe an owner’s right to perform or
deliver the work in public. Section 3(4) of the Copyright
Act expressly provides that ‘‘for the purposes of subsection (1), the act of communicating the work to the
public by telecommunication does not constitute the act
of performing or delivering the work in public . . . ’’. 111
Potential ISP infringement of these rights can therefore
be safely discounted.
On the other hand, however, the detailed commentary Tariff 22 offers with respect to the ISP exemption
from liability for infringing the right to communicate to
the public by telecommunications, leaves unsettled in
Canadian law the basic yet fundamentally important
issue as to whether the activities of an ISP might infringe
an owner’s exclusive right to reproduce a work. This is
because as tariff proceedings, where a royalty could only
be imposed if ISPs were found to infringe an owner’s
right to communicate to the public by telecommunication or an authorization of that right, the question of ISP
liability for infringement generally was not fully in issue.
Significantly, the common carrier exemption only protects an ISP from liability based on the communication
by telecommunication right and leaves open the possibility that an ISP might infringe other rights while still
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acting as a ‘‘mere conduit’’ with respect to communication. 112 The lack of guidance in this area leaves such
direct liability open to speculation.
In Netcom and subsequent American cases, the
courts suggested that an ISP did not infringe an owner’s
exclusive right to reproduce the work simply because it
had made a digital copy of the work either in the course
of transmitting a user’s message or temporarily caching a
site on its server. 113 Sookman argues that Canadian law
should also follow this approach, suggesting that for an
ISP ‘‘to be liable for infringement [of the reproduction
right] there must . . . be an element of causation by the
alleged infringer’’. 114 This however, goes against the technical reality that when a user simply browses a site or an
ISP caches a Web page, a digital copy — however temporary or ephemeral — is made and the owner’s exclusive
right to reproduction is prima facie infringed. 115 It is
possible, and even likely according to the Information
Highway Advisory Committee, that the Copyright Act
would therefore not permit the reproduction of works
for the purposes of caching. 116 Indeed, this interpretation
seems almost to inevitably flow from Evans J.A. conclusion in Tariff 22 that in creating a cache, an ISP is no
longer providing ‘‘only the means of telecommunication
necessary to communicate to the public’’. It is but a short
extension to suggest that caching is no longer providing
only the means of telecommunication precisely because
it involves an infringement of the reproduction right.
And, as the Court suggested in Frena, the fact that
an ISP or user does not intend to make a copy is irrelevant. As reproduction is a direct right of the owner,
‘‘neither intention to infringe nor knowledge that the
acts constitute infringement is necessary to make out the
cause of action’’. 117 But this legal approach to ISP caching
is clearly problematic. As Whyte D.J. noted in Netcom,
such a result risks extending ISP liability for copyright
infringement to virtually any infringing transmission
made on the Internet. 118 And, as Sharlow J.A. noted in
dissent in Tariff 22, it also displays a technological inflexibility inconsistent with the practical realities of the
Internet. 119
The solution to this dilemma might be found in the
concept of an implied licence. The Supreme Court has
suggested that an otherwise infringing use of a work
might be permitted where there is a clear inference of
consent from the person holding the particular right
alleged to be infringed. 120 For some analysts, this implied
licence solves the problem of interminable liability for
the automatic copying that occurs during caching,
browsing or linking:
The concept of implied licence is important for ISPs and
other operators with respect to caching and for users with
respect to browsing. If a copyright owner has permitted the
work to be placed on the Internet, it could be argued that
the owner has implicitly consented to caching as a necessary
method of copying the work to permit the work to be
accessed and transmitted to the user in an effective way. 121
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However, as this passage suggests and the Court
held in Bishop, 122 an implied licence can only exist
where the copyright owner initially posts or authorizes
the posting of a work to the Internet. Consequently,
where the initial posting of the material is itself
infringing, an implied licence will likely not be invoked
to excuse the user’s or ISP’s temporary reproduction of
work during browsing or caching. Alternatively, a court
might be persuaded to adopt the more flexible Netcom
approach and simply impart a knowledge requirement
for direct liability. While such options are more reasonable than the alternative of considering caching and
browsing infringements of the reproduction right, the
position in Canadian law on this point remains ambiguous.
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Authorized Infringement
In addition to the specific rights enumerated in
s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act, it is also an infringement to
authorize another person to perform any of the s. 3(1)
activities without the consent of the owner. Authorization is a separate and distinct right of the copyright
holder and, if infringed, constitutes an independent
wrong in addition to the infringements of anyone who
acts upon that authorization. 123 In addition, the s. 2.4(1)
exemption for common carriers does not extend to
shield a party from liability for an infringement of the
authorization right. This raises the issue of whether —
quite apart from its potential liability for direct infringement discussed above — an ISP that allows subscribers
access to infringing material or hosts a subscriber’s Web
page that contains infringing content can be said to
authorize the infringing reproduction, public display or
communication by telecommunication of that material.
Pre-Tariff 22 commentary predicted that this issue
would be the most important legal concept involved in
identifying liability in the Internet environment in Canadian law. 124
Fortunately for ISPs, the courts have narrowly interpreted the concept of ‘‘authorization’’ to require actions
that ‘‘sanction, approve or countenance infringement’’. 125
Joyal J. recently explained that this means a party must
do more than merely supply another party with equipment that might be used for infringing activities. 126 To
authorize another party’s infringement, the purported
authorizer must have enough control over the infringer
to prevent the infringement and behave in a way that
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that they
had approved or countenanced infringement. 127 Furthermore, there is a presumption that use of equipment is
authorized only so far as the activity for which it is to be
used is in accordance with the law. 128 So, in an action
brought by a record company against the manufacturer
of double-cassette stereos that were advertised for their
ability to copy recorded works, the House of Lords held
that the defendant did not ‘‘authorize’’ any infringement
because it lacked control over the equipment once sold
and did not purport to grant permission for copying. 129
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However, the focus on control leaves open the possibility
that an ISP — which, unlike the vendor of a cassettedeck or VCR, arguably continues to exercise control over
a subscriber’s infringing activities by maintaining their
access connection or hosting their Web page — might
be found to ‘‘authorize’’ that infringement.
The Board’s decision in Tariff 22 partially clarified
how the concept of authorization might apply to ISPs.
Although the Board held that a work is not communicated over the Internet when it is made available but
rather only when it is transmitted, it nonetheless held
that the communication of such a work is authorized
when it is posted. 130 This means that the person who
makes the work available on the Web site not only
communicates that work, but also authorizes its communication. The initial poster of the work places it online
for the sole purpose of having it communicated and with
full knowledge and intention that such communication
should occur and thus authorizes the communication. 131
The Board went on to expressly state that ISPs do not
authorize the communication of a work:
Even knowledge by an ISP that its facilities may be
employed for infringing purposes does not make the ISP
liable for authorizing the infringement if it does not purport
to grant to the person committing the infringement a
licence or permission to infringe. An intermediary would
have to sanction, approve or countenance more than the
mere use of equipment that may be used for infringement.
Moreover, an ISP is entitled to presume that its facilities will
be used in accordance with the law. 132

According to the Board’s analysis, therefore, in addition to technical issues concerning the extent of an ISP’s
control, ISPs appeared to be immune from allegations of
infringement of the authorization right so long as they
refrained from purporting to grant subscribers permission to infringe.
The Federal Court of Appeal largely affirmed the
reasoning of the Board, but diverged slightly in cautioning that some conduct might in fact amount to
authorization by ISPs. Evans J.A. acknowledged that it is
not feasible for ISPs to monitor and control in any systematic way the content of material transmitted to subscribers. He concluded that absent this control element,
an ISP that merely provides access to subscribers could
not be said to authorize a content poster’s infringing
communication to those end users. 133 Even for ISPs that
operate as host servers for subscribers’ sites from which
infringing material is transmitted, where a greater degree
of control over content might be present, the Court held
that ISPs do not implicitly authorize a communication
of that infringing work:
. . .[I]t seems counterintuitive to conclude that a person who
supplies the means to enable another to communicate
material thereby authorizes, as opposed, say, to facilitates, its
communication by that other person. The concept of
‘‘authorizing’’ implies that the person who is alleged to have
authorized has the right to give any requisite permission. 134

However, notwithstanding this conclusion, Evans
J.A. went on to suggest that an implicit authorization to
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communicate infringing material might be inferred if an
ISP failed to remove infringing material on a hosted site
after being advised of its presence on the server and
given a reasonable opportunity to take it down. 135
This cautionary note is problematic in that it runs
counter to the reasoning both of the Board and the
Federal Court of Appeal and adds considerable uncertainty to the concept of authorization. It is extremely
difficult to see how the provision of notice to an ISP can
suddenly bestow that ISP with the ‘‘right to give any
requisite permission’’ that Evans J.A. states must be present to constitute authorization. In speculating on this
point, the Court relied on obiter comments in a single
English case, 136 which pre-dated the House of Lords’
decision in Amstrad, 137 to the effect that a supplier’s
indifference as to the infringing use of its equipment
may reach such a degree that authorization can be
inferred. But indifference, even in the face of notice and
a possible requirement to act to remove infringing material, cannot create in an ISP the right to authorize
another party’s infringement. As explained below, 138
under Canadian copyright law the effect of notice and
the ISP’s consequent ‘‘knowledge’’ of subscriber infringement is better considered under the head of indirect
infringement than authorization.

Indirect Infringement
Although Canadian common law has not developed a distinct doctrine of ‘‘contributory infringement’’
as exists in the United States, there is still the possibility
that ISPs in Canada could be held indirectly liable for
the infringing activities of a subscriber. This secondary
liability for infringement falls under the s. 27(4)(b) distribution right of copyright owners which restricts a party
with knowledge that material infringes from distributing
that material either for the purposes of trade or to such
an extent that it prejudicially affects the owner. 139 Unlike
the direct infringement of the right to copy, right to
communicate to the public by telecommunication, or
right of authorization, the knowledge of infringement is
a key element for a finding of indirect liability. The
Courts have interpreted ‘‘knowledge’’ in this context to
mean ‘‘notice of facts such as would suggest to a reasonable [person] that a breach of the copyright law was
being committed’’. 140 As the Federal Court explained in
Apple Computer , knowledge of infringement will
impose certain obligations on a party that deals with
infringing material:
Once an individual has either actual or imputed knowledge
that the work dealt with may be infringing copyright, the
individual has an obligation to make enquiries to ensure
that the work does not infringe copyright. 141

Extending these obligations to the context of the
Internet suggests that if an ISP fails to take reasonable
steps to prevent continuation of a particular subscriber’s
infringing activities once put on notice of such infringement, the ISP itself may be liable for indirect infringement. 142 An ISP that still knowingly permits a subscriber
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to use its equipment for distribution of infringing material may be considered to ‘‘aid and abet’’ that infringement and thus be found liable for indirect infringement. 143
The Tariff 22 decision does not expressly confront
the issue of potential indirect liability of ISPs. However,
such an infringement remains possible. As with the
authorization right, the benefit of the s. 2.4(1)(b) exemption does not extend to protect ISPs from claims of
secondary infringement under s. 27(4)(b). As suggested
above, Evans J.A.’s comments as to the effect of notice
with respect to an infringement of the authorization
right are arguably more appropriately considered in relation to this indirect infringement. Indeed, similar to
Evans J.A., the Board appeared to have left open the
possibility that once put on notice of a subscriber’s
infringement, an ISP that fails to take action may be
indirectly liable if it is deemed to be acting ‘‘in concert’’
with the infringing subscriber. 144 However, like
Netcom’s brief discussion of contributory infringement,
the fact that neither the Board nor the Federal Court of
Appeal were required to address this specific issue leaves
several uncertainties. 145 There is no guidance as to the
details of the content and degree of specificity required
for a notice to sufficiently bring a subscriber’s infringement to the ‘‘knowledge’’ of an ISP. Would a Canadian
court adopt the broad ‘‘more than mere allegation’’ yet
less than ‘‘unequivocal proof’’ guidelines proposed in
Netcom? As Hayes points out, the nature of an ISP’s
obligations once put on notice of subscriber infringement also remain vague. 146 Must an ISP simply request
the subscriber to desist any infringing activity? Or, is
there an obligation to disable access? Although Netcom
suggests the latter, higher duty is imposed under the
American doctrine of contributory infringement, 147 and
the Canadian position under indirect infringement
remains uncertain.

Proposals for Reform
The state of Canadian law regarding ISP liability for
online infringement, whether arising out of its own activities or those of its subscribers, remains unresolved.
Although the Tariff 22 decision suggests that ISPs will
not be held to infringe the right to communicate to the
public by telecommunication (so long as they refrain
from caching activities) or to have authorized such communication, the decision fails to clarify whether an ISP
might infringe the reproduction right. It also remains
unclear what effect notice of infringement would have
on potential ISP liability. Furthermore, there is the added
concern that obiter comments of Evans J.A. appear to
leave open the possibility that even if ISPs are not subjected to any tariff that is ultimately established, they
may nonetheless still find themselves as defendants in an
infringement action. 148 And, of course, the fact that the
decision is currently under review before the Supreme
Court of Canada further contributes to the uncertain

125

ISP Liability for Online Copyright Infringement

direction of the law in this area. In addition to these
concerns, there is also a sense that courts are ill equipped
to resolve the highly technical and broad policy issues
raised by questions of ISP liability. 149 These legal and
policy concerns suggest that amendments to the Copyright Act are required to clarify the state of Canadian law
surrounding ISP liability for copyright infringement.
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The Consultation Paper directly addresses this perceived need for legislative action. Acknowledging that it
is not technically feasible for ISPs to monitor the content
of all transmissions or subscriber material, 150 and
insisting that clear and fair rules for ISP liability are
imperative for the growth of the technology sector in
Canada, the Consultation Paper proposes three areas for
reform to the Copyright Act regarding ISP liability.
Although the discussion is framed in relatively broad
terms, these proposals appear to be modelled on the
American approach in the DMCA. First, the amendments would provide ISPs with a statutory limitation of
liability for copyright infringement arising out of its own
activities or those of its subscribers. The Consultation
Paper suggests:
An ISP would not be liable for copyright infringement when
its facilities are used by a third party (including its clients)
for disseminating copyright-protected material, whether this
dissemination is understood as a communication to the
public (i.e. through a network transmission process) or
reproduction (e.g. for the purposes of caching or web site
hosting). Similarly, the ISP would not be liable for reproductions of copyrighted materials in the form of caches that
facilitate the communications process where the original or
initial communication is authorized. 151

This provision would, therefore, overrule the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision to allow ISPs and their
subscribers the benefit of caching. This would also
obviate the need to stretch the implied licence doctrine
to cover those situations where it would not apply
because the original material is not posted with authorization of the owner. The amendments would exempt an
ISP’s automatic file copying from infringing the owner’s
reproduction right.
Second, a complaint driven notice and take-down
process similar to that in the DMCA would be incorporated into the Copyright Act to deal with hosting or
caching of infringing material. Although any such process would be subject to contractual arrangements made
between particular ISPs and rights holders, it would supplant the voluntary CAIP code of conduct that ISPs are
currently encouraged to observe in their relationships
with subscribers. 152 As the Consultation Paper explains,
this process would obligate ISPs to block access to
infringing material posted by subscribers or to restrain
their own caching activities once notice is received:
Under a notice and take-down system, an intermediary is
shielded from copyright liability unless, after having
received notice of infringing material on its facilities, it fails
to take requisite steps to address the situation. Notice creates
the impetus for the ISP to remove the offending material by
exposing the ISP to the risk of (greater) liability for failure to
act on such a notice. 153

Although an ISP is still entitled to presume that its
equipment will be used for lawful purposes, that presumption can be rebutted if a copyright owner notifies
an ISP that it is storing infringing material (as under the
DMCA). Accordingly, an ISP would become statutorily
liable if it failed to block access to a subscriber’s allegedly
infringing material or desist with its own infringing
caching activities within a specified time after receiving
proper notice from the rights holder. 154 This clarifies the
uncertainty surrounding ‘‘authorization’’ and ‘‘indirect
infringement’’ under s. 27(4) in that it requires ISPs to
exercise their control over hosting and caching activities
once notified. 155
Third and finally, the amendments would limit the
liability of ISPs that might arise out of any subscriber
claim against an ISP for its compliance with the notice
and take-down process. An ISP acting in ‘‘good faith’’
that blocks access to a specified site upon receipt of
proper notice would not be liable for any harm suffered
by its client or other third party if the alleged infringement is not in fact substantiated. 156 Again, as under the
American DMCA process, this removes the necessity for
an ISP to assess whether the claimant in fact holds the
rights allegedly infringed and to determine whether the
alleged infringer’s activities might be validly authorized
or fall within one of the fair dealing exemptions. The ISP
need only comply with the requirement to block access;
there is no need to assess the validity of the infringement
claim.

Assessing the impact of proposed
reforms

I

t is not enough to simply note that the government’s
proposed reforms appropriately respond to the technical difficulties surrounding ISP liability and provide
some much needed clarity and predictability in this area
of the law. It is also vital that the impact of these reforms
on the nature of copyright law itself — and the social
and economic reasons for which it purportedly exists —
be carefully considered. Professor Vaver encourages this
line of inquiry: ‘‘ . . . [I]f the allocation of these property
rights is simply a means to an end . . . then one must ask
if the means is the most effective way to that end’’. 157 Of
course, any such assessment of the effectiveness of the
means — that is, the proposed reforms — will depend
on which ‘‘end’’ copyright law is deemed to serve. In this
respect, two justifications are posited for the existence of
copyright law — one based on natural rights, and the
other on utilitarian theory. While the results of the proposed limitation of ISP liability might prove disappointing from the former perspective, the effects of the
proposed measures suggest that the fundamental basis of
Canadian copyright law is shifting more in favour of the
latter approach. However, even if the proposed limitation of ISP liability suggests considerable concern with
the utilitarian ‘‘balancing’’ function of copyright law, it is
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not clear that the proposed amendments as they currently stand achieve an entirely acceptable balance. In
particular, revisions to the notice and take-down scheme
might be required.
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Natural Rights Theory: Primacy to
Protecting Intellectual Property
The natural rights justification for copyright law is
based on John Locke’s theory of property and emerged
in support of intellectual property during the French
Revolution. 158 The central premise is that copyright is
merely an extension of the basic human right to the
product of one’s own labour. If physical labour yields a
right to tangible property, the intellectual labour
involved in creating an artistic work likewise yields a
right to intangible property. Earlier proposals for amendments to the Copyright Act clearly embraced this absolute property perspective on the purpose of copyright.
For example, the 1985 report A Charter of Rights for
Creators stated: ‘‘The Sub-Committee [on the Revision
of Copyright] . . . takes the opportunity to assert that
‘ownership is ownership is ownership’. The copyright
owner owns the intellectual works in the same sense as a
landowner owns land’’. 159 In addition to this propertybased argument, two other ideas are frequently cited to
buttress the natural rights justification for copyright: first,
authors have a moral right to have their creations protected as an extension of their person; and second,
authors have a right to reward for making a valued contribution to society. 160
If one relies upon the natural rights justification for
copyright law, the effects of the proposed amendments
to the Copyright Act might be deemed to fall short of
fulfilling the underlying purpose of the statute. Any statutory limitation on the liability of ISPs would, according
to this perspective, represent a degradation of the protected rights of a copyright owner and thereby fail to
keep the Act up to pace with the digital environment.
This would be particularly vexing where new technologies already threaten the scope of protection afforded to
copyright owners. Indeed, this is the substance of objections to the proposed amendments from collective rights
holders such as SOCAN and the CRIA, which argue that
a limitation of liability for any party infringes an artist’s
rights to full compensation for use of their works. 161
Here, with an exclusive focus on the rights of the owner
to protection, the effects of a proposed limitation of liability for ISPs might be considered an inappropriate
direction for copyright law or an indication that it has
resigned itself to technological defeat.
However, the use of ‘‘natural rights’’ as the ‘‘end’’ by
which to assess the ‘‘means’’ of the proposed amendments does not stand up to scrutiny. Despite its appeal in
Western societies, where ‘‘property’’ rights are easily
understood and tend to be strongly protected, 162 the
justification of copyright law as a natural right of authors
is subject to considerable criticism. Professor Vaver dis-
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misses the ‘‘moral’’ justification of copyright law because
its underlying rationale is simply inconsistent with
existing statutory regimes:
But these arguments fail to make the case . . . The logic
flowing from a concept of natural rights, that ideas should
be protected in perpetuity and throughout the world, has
never been accepted by even the most ardent promoters of a
strict intellectual property regime. 163

Casting copyright law as a natural right ignores the
fact that copyright is purely a creation of statute and
represents a deliberate government intervention in the
market for creating and distributing artistic works. The
scope of this intervention is therefore a question of social
and economic policy, not interference with ‘‘natural
rights’’. 164 In addition to these critiques, a focus on the
natural rights of individual creators ignores the contributions of previous creators and the significance of the
public domain in generating and shaping ideas. 165
Authors do not create works entirely within the confines
of their own individual minds but are fundamentally
dependent upon the ideas and forms of expression that
have preceded their own creations. Consequently, it may
be inappropriate to focus solely on the protections
afforded rights holders in assessing the effects of the
proposed reforms.

Utilitarian Theory: Balancing Creative
Incentive with Public Access
Given these shortcomings of the natural rights perspective, a more utilitarian explanation for copyright law
is frequently embraced today and may serve as a better
standard against which to measure the proposed amendments. Rather than focus on the rights of authors, this
law and economics-based approach views copyright law
as performing a sort of public intellectual wealth maximization function. 166 Seen in this way, the purpose of
copyright law is to balance the competing interests of
creators to profit from their works and the public to
access those works. 167 The law is essentially a ‘‘bargain’’
between the public and copyright holders that is ultimately aimed at the public benefit derived from conferring rights on authors. 168 As Fewer explains:
Under utilitarian analysis, copyright is justified as an incentive system, granting exclusive rights to authors for limited
periods of time to encourage the production of intellectual
works. Such rights are granted in the public interest to
maximize the dissemination of intellectual goods in the
marketplace. If authors were not guaranteed the chance to
exploit their intellectual works, the danger would exist that
intellectual works would be underproduced — through a
lack of incentives for producers to invest time, money and
effort in intellectual works. 169

Of course, the converse danger is also true: if the
incentives are too high, the result is an inefficient distribution of works that ultimately goes to benefit rights
holders at the expense of restricting public access. If one
adopts this utilitarian perspective, ‘‘the richness and
vibrancy of the public domain can be regarded . . . as a
test of the merit of our intellectual property regimes’’. 170
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In the United States, the balancing objective of copyright law is constitutionally entrenched and dominates
judicial thinking on the topic. 171 In Canada, where the
grant of constitutional authority over copyright does not
hint as to its rationale or how it is to be exercised, 172
there is nonetheless considerable support for adopting
the utilitarian justification. The fact that the first English
copyright statute was entitled A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning has been taken as support for the
public benefit aspect of copyright law. 173 More significantly, the limited term of copyright protections,
common carrier exception, fair-dealing exemptions, and
compulsory licensing schemes contained within the
Copyright Act itself suggest that the rights of creators are
to be balanced against the public interest in accessing
works.
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Despite these features that point towards a utilitarian approach to copyright law, until recently there had
been relatively little express judicial pronouncement on
the purpose of copyright law. Indeed, writing only five
years ago, Fewer relied in part on the following ex cathedra comments of McLachlin J. (as she then was) to
support an argument in favour of the utilitarian
approach to copyright law:
We must stop thinking of intellectual property as an absolute and start thinking of it as a function — as a process,
which, if it is to be successful, must meet diverse aims: the
assurance of a fair reward to creators and inventors and the
encouragement of research and creativity, on the one hand;
and, on the other hand, the widest possible dissemination of
the ideas and products of which the world, and all the
individuals in it, have such great need. 174

The Federal Court of Appeal has, in the past, similarly emphasized the need to balance interests. In
reviewing a decision of the Copyright Board, Letourneau
J.A. remarked that ‘‘the Board properly understood its
function when it stated that it had to regulate the balance of market power between copyright owners and
users’’. 175
However, these earlier hints that the Courts might
have favoured a utilitarian justification for copyright
appear to have been clearly endorsed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in its recent Théberge v. Galerie d’Art
du Petit Champlain inc. decision. 176 Speaking for a 4–3
majority, Binnie J. accepts that copyright law is ‘‘a balance between promoting the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of work of the arts
and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator’’. 177 Drawing on economic terminology, he suggests
that this objective is achieved neither by overcompensating nor undercompensating artists, but rather requires
an optimally efficient level of compensation. 178 Binnie J.
adds the cautionary note that extending rights holders’
control over access too far threatens the long-term interests of society as a whole and creates improper impediments to the use of creative material. 179 Here then, notwithstanding the apparently divergent views of the three
dissenting justices, 180 the Supreme Court of Canada

expressly endorses a utilitarian justification of copyright
law.
Even if judicial support for conceptualizing copyright law as a balancing act between private and public
interests remains divided, there is no doubt that this
justification underlies the current government’s policy to
reform the Copyright Act. The Framework for Copyright
Reform repeatedly emphasizes the importance of balance in any proposals for reform: ‘‘It is imperative that
we ensure an appropriate balance between copyright
protection and access to works in the new technological
environment’’. 181 The Consultation Paper similarly
focuses on the dual function of the statute: ‘‘The Copyright Act serves to recognize, promote and protect intellectual expression, as well as to encourage and enable
access to and dissemination of such expression’’. 182
Taken together, the documents clearly aim to ensure
that amendments to the Copyright Act achieve a balance
between creators and the public that ensures the use of
digital technology and the Internet as a forum for both
artistic expression and public communication. 183

Limited ISP Liability with Notice and
Take-Down — An Acceptable Balance?
If, then, one relies upon this utilitarian function as
the copyright ‘‘end’’ according to which the proposed
amendments should be assessed, it appears that the
effects of the proposed amendments may indeed help
copyright law find a new balance in the digital age. The
limitation of liability for ISPs, coupled with a notice and
take-down process, approximates a beneficial compromise between the interests of public access and owner
protection. On one hand, the protections for ISPs provide a predictable legal framework that promotes technological investment and a competitive ISP sector, which
in turn ultimately promise to increase the public’s ability
to access the vast array of content available on the
Internet. 184 On the other hand, ISPs do not get an
unqualified exemption from liability. The notice and
take-down process provides an incentive for ISPs to help
owners stop online copyright infringement and thereby
secures added protection for rights holders in the digital
environment. 185 While the notice and take-down system
places the burden of monitoring infringement upon the
owner, it nonetheless provides a quick and inexpensive
mechanism to have infringing material removed. 186
Thus, in its attempt to promote access while simultaneously preserving the incentive to create, the proposed
amendments appear to move copyright law towards a
suitable balance for the digital age.
Despite this appearance of balance, however, a brief
caution about the effect of the notice and take-down
process deserves attention. While the proposed process
does seem to weigh the interests of both ISPs and copyright owners, it appears to neglect the interests of alleged
infringers and thereby opens the scheme to potential
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abuse. 187 The obligation of ISPs to remove allegedly
infringing material once notice is received, coupled with
the limitation of liability for an ISP who acts in ‘‘good
faith’’ to block access to allegedly infringing material,
creates an environment ripe for the ‘‘overaggressive
enforcement of copyright against subscribers who have
in fact committed no infringement’’. 188 By encouraging
ISPs to indiscriminately remove or block access to subscriber material in order to receive the limitation of liability protection, the notice and take-down process is too
heavily skewed in favour of rights owners. 189 Indeed, the
requirement that an ISP block access upon receipt of
notice creates a presumption that the subscriber’s activities are infringing. The onus falls on the alleged infringer
to then bring an action to prove that its activities are not
infringing in order to have its material reposted. This
runs counter to the normal burden of proof that rests
upon an owner to prove infringement before a court will
grant an injunction or other remedy. As Yen suggests,
this particular form of notice and take-down process ‘‘is
tantamount to awarding the content provider a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
without any hearing before a court or the posting of a
bond’’. 190
The proposed notice and take-down procedure
should be revised to eliminate its potential use as a
means to arbitrarily block access to non-infringing material. At the very least, a counter-notification should be
included that provides alleged infringers an opportunity
to rebut the allegations against them. Or, as the Canadian Association of Internet Providers recommends, the
government should adopt a ‘‘notice and notice’’ system
rather than the proposed notice and take-down process.
Under this alternative, rather than requiring an ISP to
disable or block access to a subscriber’s infringing material immediately obtaining a notice from the purported
copyright owner, the ISP instead forwards the notice to
its subscriber. If the alleged infringer does not voluntarily
remove its material, the ISP releases the subscriber’s identity to the purported rights holder who can then apply to
the court for an order requiring the ISP to disable access
to the material. 191 Such a scheme has the advantage that
decisions concerning the illegality of a subscriber’s
actions and orders for enforcement rest with a court of
law and not under the private purview of purported
rights holders. Indeed, the federal government has
already incorporated such a judicially-ordered take-down
scheme in relation to online child pornography. 192 If this
more precautionary approach is deemed appropriate in
the context of the arguably more socially-condemnable
posting of child pornography, certainly similar safeguards
should be afforded to alleged copyright infringers. Otherwise, enforcement of this area of the law will effectively
devolve to private rights holders, a result inconsistent
with the need to balance private interest and public
access in copyright law.
This cautionary note over the potential impact of
the notice and take-down process might be dismissed as
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a relatively trifling concern, especially when viewed
against the massive potential for online infringement.
Surely, some might argue, a process that is biased slightly
in favour of rights holders accords with the reality of
widespread infringement and enforcement difficulties
experienced online. Indeed, such arguments might even
be acceptable if the limitation of ISP liability is viewed in
isolation from the other amendments proposed in the
Consultation Paper. However, if these other amendments are also considered — and in particular the contemplated restrictions on the use, manufacture and trade
of devices that facilitate circumvention of technological
measures intended to protect copyright works 193 — concerns about inordinate control resting in the hands of
private rights holders become more justified. Similar
anti-circumvention provisions contained in the DMCA
have been thoroughly criticized for upsetting copyright’s
balance because they risk surrendering all control over
access to works to the rights holders. 194 Indeed, the Consultation Paper acknowledges this risk and, rather than
forward concrete proposals in this area, merely invites
‘‘dialogue’’ from interested stakeholders on a range of
options. 195 Similar attention to the manner in which the
copyright balance might be upset should be devoted to
the design of the notice and take-down regime.

Conclusion

P

rofessor Lunney suggests: ‘‘As we begin a new millennium, we face a choice both as to how, and more
importantly why, we protect creative works’’. 196 The
issue of ISP liability for online copyright infringement
forces the courts, legislators and society generally to confront these questions. The technological phenomena of
digitization and the Internet present unparalleled challenges to whether and how copyright law can protect
artistic works. As the conduits that make these technologies accessible to the public, ISPs have figured largely in
this debate and the courts have struggled with how to
articulate their responsibilities.
Analysis of the evolutionary treatment of ISP liability in American law, together with examination of the
current uncertain status of Canadian jurisprudence in
this area, confirms that the government’s proposed
amendments to the Copyright Act to limit the liability of
ISPs are necessary to provide predictability in this area
and, perhaps more importantly, to ensure that copyright
law continues as a technically reasonable mechanism for
protecting creative works. At the same time, these
amendments also implicitly respond to the question of
why copyright law exists, and whether it can retain any
social legitimacy in the new digital setting. In implementing broad limitations of liability for ISPs while
imposing a notice and take-down process that encourages ISPs to help rights holders police infringement
where it is feasible to do so, the proposed amendments
approach an acceptable balance between private and
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public interests. The amendments effectively address
both the need to provide an incentive for creators to use
the Internet through adequate copyright protections and
the imperative to promote public access to works
through an expanding global network. Notwithstanding
some required revisions to the details of the notice and

take-down process and a continued need to evaluate
whether and how copyright law can maintain its balancing function within a rapidly changing environment,
the statutory limitation of liability for ISPs is an appropriate first-step in adapting the Copyright Act to deal
with digital technologies.
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